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Abstract
Background: During the last decade there has been a growing concern about the lack of results in the health
sectors of many low income countries. Progress has been particularly slow in maternal- and child health. Prompted
by the need to accelerate progress towards these health outcomes, pay-for- performance (P4P) schemes have been
initiated in a number of countries. This paper explores the perceptions and experiences of health workers with P4P
bonus distribution in the health system context of rural Tanzania.
Methods: This qualitative study was based on the P4P pilot in Pwani Region of Tanzania. The study took place in
11 health care facilities in Rufiji District. The study informants and participants were different cadres of health
workers assigned to different outpatient and inpatient departments at the health facilities, and local administrators
of the P4P bonus distribution. Thirty two in-depth interviews (IDIs) with administrators and health care workers, and
six focus group discussions (FGDs with Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) staff, non-RCH staff and non-medical
staff were conducted. Collected data was analyzed through qualitative content analysis.
Results: The study found that the bonus distribution modality employed in the P4P programme was experienced
as fundamentally unjust. The bonuses were calculated according to the centrality of the health worker position in
meeting targeted indicators, drawn from the reproductive and child health (RCH) section. Both RCH staff and non-RCH
perceived the P4P bonus as unfair. Non-RCH objected to getting less bonus than RCH staff, and RCH staff running the
targeted RCH services, objected to not getting more P4P bonus. Non-RCH staff and health administrators suggested a
flat-rate across board as the fairest way of distributing P4P bonuses. The perceived unfairness affected work motivation,
undermined teamwork across departments and created tensions in the social relations at health facilities.
Conclusion: Our results suggest that the experience of unfairness in the way bonuses are distributed and administered
at the health facility level undermines the legitimacy of the P4P scheme. More importantly, long term tensions and
conflicts at the workplace may impact negatively on the quality of care which P4P was intended to improve. We argue
that fairness is a critical factor to the success of a P4P scheme and that particular attention should be paid to aspects of
workplace justice in the design of P4P bonus structures.
Keywords: Results-based financing (RBF), Pay for Performance (P4P), Health worker motivation, Incentives, Fairness,
Social relations, Distributive and procedural justice, Health sector, Tanzania
* Correspondence: vchimhutu2002@yahoo.com
1Department of Health Promotion and Development, University of Bergen,
P.O Box 7807, 5020 Bergen, Norway
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2016 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Chimhutu et al. Globalization and Health  (2016) 12:77 
DOI 10.1186/s12992-016-0213-5
Background
Many low-income countries did not meet the targets set
by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 4 and 5
to improve child and maternal health [1]. During the last
decade there has been a growing concern about the lack
of positive results in the health sectors of many low in-
come countries, in particular in maternal health, and new
strategies to improve these health outcomes have been in-
troduced. One such strategy is pay-for-performance (P4P)
which is embraced by many policy-makers as a way to
achieve progress towards these goals [2]. P4P is defined as
“transfer of money or material goods conditional on tak-
ing a measurable action or achieving a predetermined per-
formance target”[3]. With its focus on results, P4P fitted
into the MDG paradigm, where attention was given to a
few targeted indicators for rapid progress [2]. To date,
over 30 low-income countries (LICs) are currently imple-
menting P4P projects, with the majority of them in sub-
Saharan Africa [4].
Limited research has been carried out on the effective-
ness of P4P in LICs and it is not known whether P4P
will facilitate health system improvements in the long
run. Two evaluation studies assessing the effects of P4P
in Rwanda and Tanzania concluded that the schemes
had led to an increase in the usage of certain maternal
and child health services, including facility deliveries
[5, 6]. The Rwanda study, a randomized controlled
trial, found that P4P incentives had the greatest effect
on the services that had the highest bonus payment
rates and needed the least efforts from the service
provider, i.e. the health worker [5]. The study was
able to isolate the incentive effects from resources effects
by increasing control facilities’ input-based budgets by the
average P4P payments made to the intervention facilities.
Hence is often cited as one of the best examples on meas-
uring the effectiveness of P4P [7]. However, in Rwanda an-
other study found that P4P encouraged the prioritization of
rewarded services and a neglect of unrewarded services [8].
These behaviors are called gaming in the P4P literature and
can be detrimental to the quality of health care [9].
Two systematic reviews on the effectiveness of P4P
schemes in low to middle income countries concluded
that such schemes are less likely to create sustained
changes in health service delivery [3] and that there is
weak evidence to support that these schemes work [10].
The fact that available evidence is conflictual, fuels the
debate on whether to use P4P schemes in the health sec-
tors of low income countries. While this debate goes on
P4P schemes are increasing exponentially in the sub-
Saharan African region, which contributes to the import-
ance of generating new knowledge on how some specific
components of the existing P4P schemes work and are
perceived in local social settings. It has been noted that
social-cultural aspects plays an important role as to why
the success of P4P schemes varies across contexts [11],
and how fairness principles are perceived [12, 13]. Yet to
our knowledge, no research to date has attempted to ad-
dress how P4P bonus system, an important feature of
the scheme, is experienced in the social-cultural settings
of low-income countries. Our study attempts to bridge
this gap by exploring how health workers in local health
facilities perceive and experience the P4P bonus struc-
ture, paying particular attention on how fairness is per-
ceived and how this may affect social relations at local
health facilities in Tanzania.
Theoretical framework
P4P rests on some fundamental principles and concepts
that are important to clarify. A commonly used defin-
ition of motivation in the work context is “an individual’s
degree of willingness to exert and maintain an effort to-
wards organizational goals” [14]. Behind this definition
lies an assumption that effort and work towards the
organizational goals can be improved. In an employer-
employee relationship the employer wants to measure
and if necessary adjust the performance of the em-
ployees. An influential approach to workplace motiv-
ation is formulated through the principal-agent theory in
economics [15]. The principal-agent theory asserts that
there often is lack of correspondence between the inter-
ests of the principal (employer) and the agent (em-
ployee) when it comes to the goals to be achieved by an
organisation. To overcome this, the principal tries to
find ways of aligning the agent’s goals with the goals of
the organisation. P4P can be seen from this perspective.
The implication of the principal-agent theory is that in-
creased alignment between the goals of the principal
(employer) and the agent (employee) can be achieved in
a number of ways including the offering of financial
incentives.
Motivation is fundamental for both the quality and
quantity of the work performed. Motivation theory com-
monly distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic mo-
tivation [16]. Ryan and Deci postulates that “[t]o be
motivated means to be moved to do something. Thus a
person who feels no impetus or inspiration to act is
characterized as unmotivated, whereas someone who is
energized or activated toward an end is considered moti-
vated” [16]. In the health sector, both intrinsic and ex-
trinsic factors of motivation are considered important.
Ryan and Deci defines intrinsic motivation as “doing
something because it is inherently interesting or enjoy-
able” and extrinsic motivation as “doing something be-
cause it leads to a separable outcome” [16]. Extrinsic
factors for motivation encompass diverse incentives and
mechanisms expected to encourage a worker to increase
the effort to perform workplace tasks. The balance be-
tween intrinsic and extrinsic motivation varies between
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employees and over time. These two types of motivation
may influence each other. For example, increased extrin-
sic motivation through availability of incentives may di-
minish intrinsic motivation for the workplace tasks [17].
P4P offers financial incentives to health workers upon
reaching a predefined threshold in performance on cer-
tain indicators. Generally, only selected groups of health
workers are entitled to receive such financial incentives,
in this case health workers working with child and ma-
ternal health. The difference in access to such incentives
within health care facility may impact individual percep-
tions of fairness and justice in the P4P scheme. An im-
portant distinction in studying these perceptions is
between distributive and procedural justice. These two
notions of justice have traditionally been treated dis-
tinctly in the literature on the psychology of justice.
Distributive justice concerns allocation of goods, for
example salary and financial incentives, whereas proced-
ural justice concerns “perceptions of the fairness of
decision-making processes” [18]. Given the importance
of these notions at the workplace, there have been at-
tempts to link these two notions in a single framework
through the referent cognitions theory [18, 19]. Folger ar-
gues that the referent cognitions theory makes the rela-
tionship between these two notions explicit, highlighting
on the basis for the effects that procedures have on per-
ceptions of distributive justice [18]. The theory postu-
lates that when an outcome is seen as unjust or unfair,
the result is not merely dissatisfaction but a sense of
moral outrage which cause resentment. Therefore, the
experience of resentment towards an unfair outcome
can be analyzed in two ways, that is, consideration of an
imaginable better outcome that could have been more
satisfying (distributive justice), and improper procedures
or processes that may have hindered the attainment of
the desired outcome (procedural justice). An underlying
basic premise for the theory is that employees of any
organization tend to prefer fair treatment over unfair
treatment, based on their perceptions on what is fair.
Thus employers have a clear stake in fairness as “they
would not expect to find their most dedicated and loyal
employees among those who feel unfairly treated” [18].
Therefore, while the principal-agent theory promotes
the use of financial incentives, if not used in a proper
way such incentives may impact on perceptions of dis-
tributive and procedural justice at the workplace. Thus,
a P4P scheme can be assessed both in terms of the
actual distribution of incentives, and in terms of the
principles, processes and circumstances behind the dis-
tribution. In the implementation of P4P schemes in the
health sector, the following questions are rarely asked,
although they actually are quite fundamental: 1) how
does P4P incentive distribution modalities impact on
perceptions of fairness and health workers’ motivation,
and 2) what is the impact of the P4P incentive distri-
bution on relations among health workers at health
facilities.
Drawing on narrative interviews with health workers
who have experienced working within a P4P scheme in
Tanzania, this article attempts to provide some answers
to these questions.
Pay-for-performance (P4P) in Tanzania
Tanzania is one of the African low income countries that
have embarked on a strategy to implement P4P in the
health sector. The efforts towards meeting MDG 4 and
5 in Tanzania were followed by a significant reduction in
child mortality (in 1996: under five mortality was at 137
deaths per 1000 live births, and in 2010 it had declined
to 81 deaths per 1000 live births), while less improve-
ment has been achieved in maternal health (in 1996: ma-
ternal mortality was 529 per 100,000 live births, and in
2010 it was at 454 per 100, 000 live births) [20, 21]. Fol-
lowing the public debate on how to meet the health re-
lated MDGs by 2015, the first plans to introduce a
national P4P scheme were launched in Tanzania in 2007.
The Government of Tanzania wanted a nationwide roll-
out of P4P and argued that “P4P constitutes an import-
ant programme strategy which will increase the ability to
unleash the energy and creativity needed to address local
challenges” [22]. The international donor community
was hesitant about the feasibility of the planned P4P
[23], but despite these concerns, the Government of
Tanzania went ahead implementing P4P in a few dis-
tricts [24, 25]. In response, the international donor com-
munity pulled out the funding of this P4P programme
[24]. Consequently, the P4P programme of 2009 ended
up having very limited success.
After a series of discussions and consultations between
the Government of Tanzania and the international donor
community, a more comprehensive plan for a P4P
scheme was developed with greater focus on relevant indi-
cators and on the need to strengthen the Health Manage-
ment Information System (HMIS) [26]. The result was a
P4P pilot in 2011 that was implemented in the Pwani Re-
gion, whose evaluation has been completed [6, 27]. The
P4P pilot in Tanzania received technical support from
Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) and financial sup-
port from Norway [26].
Indicators for the P4P pilot in Tanzania are drawn
from the reproductive and child health (RCH) depart-
ment, with the majority coming from maternal and child
health section in line with the need to accelerate progress
towards unmet Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5.
The indicators cover the following areas: antenatal care,
institutional deliveries, post-natal care, prevention of
mother-to-child transmission of HIV (PMTCT), family
planning and health management information systems
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[26]. The process leading up to P4P in Tanzania has been
reported in one study as by and large a top-down process
which did not include the views of important stakeholders
such as, frontline health workers [28] who are strategically
positioned between patients and administration.
Guidelines for payment of the incentives are outlined
in the Pilot Design Document [26]. Incentive payments
are provided through the health facility and the funds
are divided into two parts; one for staff incentives and
one for facility improvements. For hospitals, 10% of the
incentive payment goes to facility improvements, while
60% is awarded reproductive and child health (RCH)
staff, and 30% non-RCH and non-medical staff. For
dispensaries and health centres, 25% goes to facility im-
provements while 75 % goes to staff bonuses. The guide-
lines recommend that bonus payments are shared
equally among RCH and non-RCH staff at dispensary
and health centre level, but this is practiced differently.
In some dispensaries and health centres RCH staff and
non-RCH staff received different bonuses. The average
bonus payment per month for most health workers is
approximately USD 30, which is about 10 percent of the
average monthly salary of nursing staff [26]. However,
for non-RCH and/or non-medical staff at hospitals the
figure can be significantly lower [26]. The bonuses are
paid twice a year, following a 6 months P4P pilot cycle.
The rules for payment are that if less than 75% of the
target is achieved, the payment for that indicator is 0, if
75–99% of the bonus is achieved, 50% of the bonus on
that indicator is paid, and if 100% percent is achieved,
then a full bonus is paid on that indicator [26].
The total amount allocated for the P4P pilot per cycle
is USD 300,000 and assuming that the pilot is scaled-up
across all regions in Tanzania, P4P will require approxi-
mately USD 16 million per year [26]. The design docu-
ment outlines maximum potential bonus payments per
health facility taking into account the typical staff profile
of each facility type. Hence, hospitals can have a poten-
tial maximum P4P bonus of approximately USD 8000
while health centres can have up to USD 2800, and dis-
pensaries a potential maximum bonus of USD 700 per
cycle of 6 months [26]. Under the P4P scheme, incen-
tives are financial and the P4P design document does
not specify any non-financial incentives[26].
Methods
Study setting
The study was carried out in Rufiji District, one of the
six districts in the Pwani Region which is piloting P4P in
Tanzania. Rufiji is a rural district and according to the
2012 national census, it had a population of 217,274
[29]. Administratively, the district is divided into 27
wards, 96 villages and 400 hamlets [29, 30]. It has a total
number of 64 health facilities, including two hospitals,
five health centres, and 57 dispensaries [30]. Like many
rural districts in Tanzania, Rufiji district faces significant
shortages of staff and of the 583 positions in the district
health sector, only 301 are filled [30].
The main feature of the district is the Rufiji River
which divides it into approximately equal geographical
halves. The majority of the district’s population lives in
the northern part, which is easily accessible throughout
the year. The southern part of the district as well as the
river delta zone may be inaccessible for varying periods
of time due to long and heavy periods of rain. The only
means of transport to the delta zone are canoes and
boats. As a result, for long periods every year health fa-
cilities in this zone face huge problems in procuring
medical supplies and in communicating with the district
health offices located at Utete, the district capital situ-
ated in the southern part of the district. This area also
finds it difficult to attract qualified health workers and
the district lags behind in health outcomes compared to
other districts in Pwani Region. However, in comparison
to national averages the district is doing well, for ex-
ample the district’s maternal mortality rate was at 306
compared to the national average of 454 per 100,000 live
births [21, 30].
Study design and data collection
A qualitative study approach was adopted to explore the
perceptions and experiences of health workers with P4P.
Data was collected by the first author together with a re-
search assistant during a 6 months period between January
and June 2013. Purposive sampling was used for the selec-
tion of health facilities and recruitment of informants. In-
depth interviews (IDIs) and focus group discussions
(FGDs) were used as main data collection methods.
Data was collected at 11 health facilities, with the aim
to cover all levels in the health referral system. In
addition, we aimed at covering a wide geographical dis-
tribution of health facilities, and the furthest facility in
our sample is approximately 50 km from Utete. Due to
poor accessibility we did not include health facilities in
the delta zone. In our sample we had two hospitals, two
health centres and seven dispensaries. Of these 11 health
facilities, four were church run and the remaining seven
were publicly owned.
Research participants
Research participants were recruited to cover diverse
categories of health workers at health facilities. Add-
itionally, at all health facilities in our sample we inter-
viewed the in-charge or their substitute. The rationale
for these selections was to get an assessment of how
P4P functioned at the particular health facility as seen
from different perspectives including that of the leader-
ship and of the different cadres of health workers. It was
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important to include health workers from different
wards and departments of the facility since the P4P
programme targeted these differently. A total of 32 IDIs
with health workers of different cadres ranging from
medical officers, assistant medical officers, clinical offi-
cers, nursing staff, laboratory staff, medical attendants
and an official from the district health office were con-
ducted, as summarized in Table 1. An interview guide
was used covering the following themes: perceptions on
individual work motivation, work relations, and experi-
ences with P4P bonus distribution.
In the course of the research, we learnt that when it
comes to the issues of bonus distribution, health workers
held collective views, depending on whether they were
RCH or non-RCH staff (including non-medical) and also
depending on how a particular facility was distributing
the bonuses. To pursue these collective views we con-
ducted FGDs with health workers from different wards.
Six FGDs with a total number of 30 participants were
conducted, three different work-area categories: three
with RCH staff, two with non-RCH staff and one with
non-medical staff, as summarized in Table 2.
Data analysis
All interviews and FGDs were conducted in Swahili, ex-
cept two interviews with medical officers which were
conducted in English. The first author speaks colloquial
Swahili, while the research assistant was a Tanzanian
citizen with experience in qualitative health services re-
search. All interviews and FGDs were recorded, tran-
scribed and translated. In addition, rapid note taking
was used. Verbatim translations from Swahili to English
were error checked. Qualitative content analysis was
used as the mode of analysis [31] and the transcripts
were subjected to a thorough review before the coding
exercise began. After coding, meaning units were con-
densed and interpreted and from these, emerging sub-
themes and themes were identified. Refer to Table 3 for
an overview of the analytical process from codes to
themes. OpenCode 3.6, a free software for qualitative
data analysis [32] was used for data management.
Results
A major topic in the IDIs and the FGDs that will be ex-
amined in the Results section concerns fairness in the
distribution of P4P bonuses. The following presentation
of results is divided in two parts that are both thematic-
ally framed within the broad theme of fairness.
The first part presents the health workers’ perceptions
of the influence of the P4P bonus modality on interper-
sonal, inter-departmental and work relations. This sec-
tion focuses in particular on the different positions of
two groups, the RCH and non-RCH staff (including
non-medical staff in the case of hospitals), and the
implications that the different positions had on work
relations. The second part presents opinions about
P4P target setting and the day-to-day management of
the pilot, with particular attention to the criteria used
in determining maximum potential facility bonus, data
verification procedures and bonus payment delays.
Interpersonal and inter-departmental relations
We do a lot here in RCH
The large majority of the informants working in the
RCH departments maintained that the current P4P
bonus distribution modality at dispensaries and health
centres, where they, unlike at hospitals get equal bonus
money with non-RCH staff was fundamentally unfair.
This perception stemmed from the fact that most P4P
targets are related to tasks in the RCH department. RCH
staff felt that they deserved higher bonuses than their
colleagues in other wards of the health facilities. As one
informant put it:
“You see P4P indicators are from RCH, we do a lot
here to meet P4P targets, a person from the laboratory
doesn’t even touch the P4P report, and even our doctor
here doesn’t know how to fill that report. Yes, we work
with them but it is only us who prepare the P4P report
and because of this RCH need to get more bonus
money. You know during the first round we even got
the same amount as security guards, how is this
possible?” (Nurse-RCH staff, Dispensary A, IDI)
The P4P Design Document allows flexibility on how to
distribute P4P bonuses. This, however, created much
variation in the distribution of bonuses, even among
health facilities at the same level in the national health
system. Some dispensaries and health centres decided to
give RCH staff more bonuses than non-RCH staff and
this was equally perceived as unfair by non-RCH staff, as
the following quote shows:
“When P4P came we thought it was for all. But later
we discovered it wasn’t even for me, a doctor or other
staff, it is only for RCH. We don’t know why it is for
Table 1 Overview of IDIs
Category of informant Number of interviews
Medical Officers (MO) 2
Assistant Medical Officers (AMO) 2
Clinical Officers (CO) 3
Nursing staff 11
Medical attendants (MA) 11
Laboratory staff 2
Official from the district health office 1
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Table 2 Overview of FGDs
FGD number Category of staff Location Participants Men Women
FGD 1 RCH Hospital K 5 1 4
FGD 2 RCH Health Centre D 5 1 4
FGD 3 RCH Dispensary B 4 0 4
FGD 4 non-RCH Hospital K 6 3 3
FGD 5 non- RCH Health Centre E 5 3 2
FGD 6 non- medical Hospital H 5 4 1
Table 3 Examples of meaning units, condensed meaning units, sub-themes and themes in qualitative content analysis
Category: bonus distribution concerns in OpenCode 3.6
Meaning unit Condensed meaning unit Interpretation
underlying meaning
Sub-theme Theme
Description close to the
text
The report for RBF comes from RCH every
end of the month, but when the bonus
come it is shared equally, even with
ecurity guards
RCH staff do more work RBF indicators are
from RCH
Negative perceptions towards
RBF bonus distribution and




I think it is a normal problem for human
to fight for money. Sometimes you see
someone who doesn’t even put an






RCH’s work is important but they
cannot accomplish this task alone,
why then do they need more bonus
than anyone else. Everyone deserves
the same RBF bonus.
Flat rates are fair ‘everyone
toils’
A flat rate need to be
used for RBF bonuses
When we sit and try to solve our
problems here concerning RBF bonus,
the RCH staff do not support me
because RBF favors them. I see this
program has some negative impacts.
Just imagine you have a family and
you give food to one of your child





We normally get our bonuses too
late. Sometimes, some people can
get their money early while others
get it late and we wonder how this
is possible
The need for RBF bonus to
be distributed timeously
Bonus is delayed RBF management concerns/
problems
Sometimes we do good work and
report good data, but during the
verification process, somehow we
always end up with lower figures.
This affects our RBF bonus money.
We don’t know what they take into
consideration
Data is not captured
properly
RBF data is not
captured properly
The thing I don’t like about RBF is
that it doesn’t consider the workload.
As you can see we are a dispensary
here but we do a lot and serve many
people, …sometimes more than a
health centre but when RBF bonus
money come they don’t consider that
workload or the number of people
we serve
Target setting not fair The criteria for setting
RBF targets not fair
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some people only while we all work here. How come
only some are benefitting? We were all happy in the
beginning, but we came to know that there was a
special group chosen. During the last distribution, I
was given as little as TZS 18,000, (RCH staff at this
facility got TZS 120,000) just the same as a security
guard and a laundry man” (Assistant medical
officer- non-RCH staff, Dispensary B, IDI)
P4P bonus distribution discourages us
There was deep frustration among non-RCH staff that
was getting less P4P bonuses than RCH staff. As P4P
targets mainly the RCH department, health staff working
in other areas, like the out-patient department, may now
put less effort into their work than before due to the
fundamental feeling of being unfairly treated:
“When the program started we were motivating each
other to work hard and together. But later we heard
that some staff will not be paid and we became
discouraged. There are a lot of things we do to assist
the RCH department, like encouraging pregnant
mothers and or encouraging them to come with their
children for check-ups, including even treating them.
But when the P4P bonus started to create these groups
we became automatically discouraged because even if
you make an effort, you will not be paid as others.
Why work in order for others to get money?” (Non-RCH
staff, Health Centre E, FGD 5)
While the distribution key used varies in health cen-
tres and dispensaries, in hospitals, RCH staff always gets
more bonus payments than non-RCH and non-medical
staff. In our data, we found the reported cases of
workers demanding to work in the RCH department in
order to get higher P4P bonuses. While this in many
ways is a positive development, especially for the mater-
nal and child health section which is traditionally per-
ceived to be dirty and demanding, there is a need to
ensure that all sections at a health facility are adequately
and fairly staffed. One medical doctor noted this
problem:
“The problem is that an element of selfishness is
present when people think of money, especially when a
person works in a section getting less P4P bonus
knowing that someone is getting more money in
another section. In the end you find that everyone
wants to work in one section, the RCH” (Medical
officer-non-RCH staff, Hospital H, IDI)
In hospitals, there are three different groups when it
comes to the distribution of P4P bonuses; the RCH,
non-RCH and non-medical staff. These different
categories get different amounts of bonuses, with the
RCH getting most and non-medical staff least. For ex-
ample, at one hospital RCH staff received TZS 107,000,
while non-RCH staff got TZS 85,000 and non-medical
staff got TZS 65,000. Non-medical staff felt less appreci-
ated as they argued that they are an important compo-
nent of the health system. They saw P4P as the only
kind of incentive available to them, while other health
workers also have opportunities for other types of
allowances:
“The program is good, but the problem starts when the
money is distributed. My opinion is that the money
should be shared equally to all because all workers
have their own responsibilities. The RCH does more on
P4P records but we have to keep in mind that it is
their duty. For example a driver does a lot, taking
RCH people to outreach and assisting them with their
work. P4P is the only motivation we have; other high
ranked staff can go for trainings and seminars
[where they have opportunities to get per diems],
what about a security guard?” (Non-medical staff,
Hospital H, FGD 6)
P4P is causing segregation and tensions
Frustrations with the distribution modality of P4P bo-
nuses under the pilot were evident across cadres and fa-
cility types. One group or another always felt unfairly
treated, independent of which distribution modality
practiced by the health facility in question. The data in-
dicated that P4P was causing tension among workers in
different sections at health facilities. These frustrations
came from the RCH staff who felt they deserve even
more bonuses, as well as and from non-RCH or non-
medical staff who felt that they were being unfairly
treated by getting lower P4P bonuses. For staff in super-
visory roles, P4P had created an uneasy working
situation:
“P4P segregates other workers and to me that is the
problem. For example, the security guards are not
involved in treatments but they are an important part
of the dispensary. As a supervisor of the dispensary I
see them all as important in meeting our objectives. If
a security guard doesn’t perform his duty well and
some damage or theft happen at the RCH, how will
they deliver their patients? Is it fair to give him less
P4P money? Can you give food to one of your child
while the others are just looking?” (Clinical officer-
non-RCH staff, Dispensary A, IDI)
A flat rate is better
In both in-depth interviews and focus group discussions
P4P bonuses were perceived to create an uneasy work
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environment at health facilities. Some of the informants
suggested that flat rates across cadres would be the fair-
est way to distribute the bonuses; however, this option
was mostly preferred by non-RCH staff, non-medical
staff and those in supervisory roles at health facilities.
The following quote illustrates this point:
“This P4P money to us is just like an asante (thank
you). You can’t divide an asante and say this one will
get a bigger portion because they have a higher
training or because they do more work. Every worker
here has a salary and we know and agree that a
salary need to consider the level of education and
training but not an asante. However, people are selfish
when it comes to money, you start to hear many staff
categories and this destroys the motivation they
intend to build. Personally I think a flat rate is
fair.” (Non-RCH, Hospital K, FGD 4)
The non-RCH staff in Rufiji argued that a flat rate is
fair. They were aware that RCH staff has extra duties
when it comes to P4P targets. However they considered
P4P bonuses as a ‘gift’ which should not be differentiated
by tasks or level of training. Workers in different wards
expressed willingness to have P4P targets related to their
own duties. When we asked a representative from the
district health offices in Rufiji if bonus distribution was
an issue of concern, we got the following response:
“Bonus distribution is a problem, in one way the RCH
plays a big role and P4P’s main focus is to reduce
maternal- and infant mortality. On the other hand,
non-RCH also plays an important role in this since
RCH staff cannot do their tasks independently of
others. When it comes to payment we are facing this
problem and non-RCH a staff is threatening to leave
all the tasks related to P4P bonuses to the RCH staff.
If this happens, the RCH staff cannot manage these
tasks alone. Therefore my opinion is to make the rates
flat so that everyone can participate effectively know-
ing that we are going to get the same bonuses. This
also helps in reducing the tensions we face since the
introduction of P4P. (Official from district health
offices, Utete, IDI)
P4P management and target setting concerns
The section present three issues: the criteria used by the
pilot in determining maximum potential facility bonuses,
data verification procedures and bonus payment delays.
Maximum potential bonuses for facilities are deter-
mined by facility type. For example, dispensaries have a
similar potential maximum bonus. However, in practice
facilities at the same level of the referral system possess
a number of variations, such as in the number of people
they serve and the number of staff available. Some dis-
pensaries in the study area had as few as two health
workers, while others had as much as twelve, way above
the nominal staff establishment at dispensaries which is
five. Health workers in the dispensaries with more staff
and a big catchment area preferred that the criterion for
maximum potential bonus be based on a case-by-case
analysis, as the following quote shows:
“The thing I don’t like about P4P is that it doesn’t
consider the workload. As you can see we are a
dispensary here but we do a lot and serve many
people. For example our vaccination target is of 60
children per month, and yet other dispensaries can
have a target of as little as five but in the end we are
all paid an equal P4P bonus. And let’s say if we don’t
reach 40 children, which is 80% of the target, we get
nothing despite the hard work. Yet someone with five
children, which is their 100%, are paid fully. So you see.
It is not ok.” (Nurse- RCH staff, Dispensary A, IDI)
The assumption behind the criterion in the current
P4P design is that facilities with big catchment areas
possess a great potential of reaching their P4P targets,
hence the need for these facilities to have higher targets
than those with a smaller catchment area. Regardless,
health workers perceived this as contributing to the
fundamental feeling of unfairness that they all seemed
to share.
The verification of data was also noted by our infor-
mants as problematic. Data verification in the Pwani
pilot is done by the Clinton Health Access Initiative
(CHAI), which manages the pilot on behalf of the Minis-
try of Health and Social Welfare. Health workers com-
plained that there were a number of disparities that
arose from the data they reported and the bonus payment
they received as a facility. Health workers explained that
the figures they had reported were considered by data ver-
ifiers to be inflated. These claims were widespread, regard-
less of facility type. The following citation captures this
concern:
“Sometimes we do good work and report good data,
but during the verification process, somehow we
always end up with lower figures. This affects our P4P
bonus money. We don’t know what they take into
consideration.” (RCH staff, Dispensary B, FGD 3)
It could be that health workers are still learning to
properly capture data, or that the verification team mis-
ses some important data during verification, which is
costly for health facilities.
Delays in bonus payments were also noted as a major
concern. Some of the payments were delayed by as
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much as a full P4P cycle [6 months]. A number of our
informants expressed this concern:
“We normally get our bonuses too late. We have had a
situation where people nearly fought in order to get
their bonuses. At this facility, sometimes, some people
can get their money early while others get it late and
we wonder how this is possible. We need to get the
money in our bank accounts just like our salaries”.
(Non-RCH staff, Health Centre E, FGD 5)
The delay in bonus disbursement was a problem which
was also noted by the district health management of
Rufiji District. As shown by the following quote:
“Generally we think P4P is a good thing, but of course
there are concerns like that bonuses have to be
increased or that they are delayed or concerning the
distribution modalities at facilities. On the delays we
have to admit that it is also our internal problems
and we are partially responsible for the delays.”
(Official from district health office, Utete, IDI).
Delays in bonus disbursements were attributed to a
number of reasons, including delays in endorsements by
the district management, which was a requirement be-
fore representatives of the respective health facilities
could withdraw their P4P bonuses from the bank. In
addition, some church run and some private health facil-
ities had no bank accounts, which was a requirement to
get bonuses. In such cases, the money had to pass
through the bank account of someone in the district
leadership, which potentially causes more delays in pay-
ment of P4P bonuses.
Discussion
Perceptions of injustice in the P4P bonus distribution
among recipients are dominant in our findings. To shed
further light on these findings, two questions warrants
discussion: Why did health workers experience the P4P
bonus structure as unfair? And what are the implications
of the perceived injustice on motivation, teamwork and
social relations among health workers in particular and
to the health sector in general?
P4P bonus structure: inescapably unfair?
Our data indicates a fundamental feeling of unfairness
relating to both actual financial incentive payouts and
the process and criteria behind the rewarding process.
We will use the referent cognition theory [18] and its two
notions of procedural and distributive justice at the
workplace to elucidate the link between the P4P bonus
structure and health workers’ feeling of unfairness.
Our data presents a clear divide between two groups
of health workers, that is, RCH staff and non-RCH staff
(including non-medical staff at hospitals). These two
groups had three different stakes when it comes to P4P
incentive payouts. The RCH staff at hospitals got more
than non-RCH staff and argued that they deserved it.
The RCH staff at dispensaries and health centres got an
equal bonus amount as non-RCH and argued that they
deserved more. Finally the non-RCH staff at hospitals
got less bonus payouts than the RCH staff and argued
that they deserved more. In other words, one group, the
RCH staff at hospitals, was satisfied with the outcome
(bonus payouts) while the other two groups, the non-
RCH staff at hospitals and RCH staff at dispensaries and
health centres, were unsatisfied. These perceptions re-
lates to the notion of distributive justice. The referent
cognitions theory predicts that people (workers) may be
more resentful to an undesired outcome for two reasons:
i) if they imagine a better outcome could be obtained in-
stead and, ii) if the events, actions, or circumstances that
prevented the better outcome seem to be improper [18].
The two groups of health workers unsatisfied with
their bonus payouts, that is, the non-RCH staff at hospi-
tals and RCH staff at dispensaries and health centres,
had different perceptions on why they deserved better
payouts. The RCH staff at dispensary and health centres
argued that they are contributing to the P4P indicators
directly; hence they should get a different rate than their
non-RCH colleagues. This argument is supported by the
logic of the principal-agent theory. The theory promotes
the alignment of individual and organizational goals, and
P4P is one mechanism aiming to achieve that by empha-
sizing the contingency of results and rewards. This sup-
ports the claim that RCH staff in dispensaries and health
centres working directly to improve the health outcomes
targeted by P4P deserved a higher rate of bonus payouts
as their counterparts in hospitals. Thus when comparing
themselves with RCH staff in hospitals, the RCH staff in
dispensaries and health centres perceived the outcome
to be too small and the bonus structure to be distribu-
tively unjust.
Non-RCH staff viewed the bonus structure as both
distributively and procedurally unjust. They argued that
they deserved more from the effort they put into their
work, which they claimed to be no less than the RCH
staff. Therefore, according to the notion of distributive
justice, they resented the current outcome (bonus
payouts), because they anticipated a better outcome
[18]. Unlike the RCH staff at dispensaries and health
centres, non-RCH staff ’s claim for more payouts is
mainly based on procedural justice. In our study con-
text the aim of P4P was to accelerate progress to-
wards MDG 4 and 5, and in this regard the RCH
staff became central.
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However, considering that P4P was a top-down reform
necessitated by unmet health care needs, one can argue
that the circumstances and processes leading to the
adoption of P4P, as a reform, had little to do with local
priorities and perceived health system challenges in
Tanzania. The design of P4P, its priority areas and bonus
distribution modality was top-down, driven primarily by
an international agenda [28]. Hence non-RCH staff con-
tends that P4P was a result of an improper process, a
process out of their control and yet they were sanctioned
for factors and decisions out of their control. Non-RCH-
staff claimed that they were deprived of the opportunity
to earn as much as their colleagues working with RCH-
services simply because P4P indicators were selected
from RCH services.
Our data points to an important discussion relating to
the issue of fairness in P4P scheme. An early critic of
P4P, Berwick claims that the P4P mechanism is toxic in
the health sector and fraught with contested values [33].
The current modality which pays according to the effort
towards targeted health services is contested and so is
the alternative modality of a flat rate. One study carried
out in Tanzania on the P4P scheme that was partially
implemented between 2009 and 2011, documented that
one district, Mvomero, decided to use a flat rate, citing
fairness and equity concerns, among other issues [25].
The same concerns were highlighted by those in super-
visory roles at health facilities in this study. Fairness is
an important aspect to consider in many socio-cultural
settings, and the socialist recent history based on the
philosophy of Ujamaa (African communal living) [34,
35], may further increase the emphasis put on this in
Tanzania. Through nostalgia, some Tanzanians, includ-
ing health workers still perceive the state as a fair and
equitable distributor of goods and services [36, 37].
Therefore, the unequal P4P bonus distribution goes
against the grain of this thinking in this particular socio-
cultural context.
Furthermore, our study indicates the importance of
structural and management concerns in a P4P scheme
in order to avoid reproducing procedural injustice. Our
study highlighted that perceived structural and manage-
ment anomalies in a P4P scheme contributed signifi-
cantly to the fundamental feeling of unfairness. For
example, informants in our study reported a number of
irregularities with data verification, facility classification
concerns and delays in bonus payouts. According to the
referent cognitions theory [18], when people (workers)
perceive the circumstances that prevented the better
outcome (more bonus payout) as improper, their resent-
ment for desired outcome increases.
Our data has shown clearly that the bonus structure of
the Pwani P4P pilot, which uses more or less the same
modality as other P4P schemes being implemented in
large parts of sub-Saharan Africa, is prone to create and
reproduce feelings of injustice at the workplace. This
finding is supported by Berwick’s claim that P4P is in-
escapably unfair [33], hence there is reason to believe
that this finding is relevant and valid beyond the study
setting. This feeling of unfairness at the work place has
implications for workers’ motivation, performance and
fundamentally social relations. Magrath and Nichter
called for P4P schemes to pay particular attention to so-
cial relations in different socio-cultural settings, in the
following section, we heed to this call using our study as
a case [11].
Unfairness: implications on motivation, teamwork and
social relations
The feeling of injustice related to P4P has unintended ef-
fects on motivation, teamwork and social relations at the
workplace [11] which all affect performance and the
quality of care. Motivation in general is important at the
workplace, and intrinsic motivation is of great import-
ance for health workers in providing quality health ser-
vices [38–40]. While there is no conclusive evidence on
the effects of P4P on intrinsic motivation in the health
sector, studies from other sectors, including that of Deci
and Ryan have concluded that the introduction of exter-
nal rewards undermines the intrinsic interest of per-
forming a task [17, 33, 41]. Studies in Rwanda have
highlighted both the potential benefits of P4P [5], and
the potential unintended effects of P4P [8, 42]. What
comes out clearly in these studies is that P4P affects the
motivation of health workers in a number of ways. Given
the effect on motivation, which in the context of our
study can be argued to be negative, we will now move
on to discuss how this affects teamwork and social rela-
tions at the health facility.
Teamwork is a salient feature in health care. A num-
ber of studies have highlighted the importance of team-
work in health care in Tanzania and other contexts [43].
P4P bonus distribution seems to trigger divisions among
health workers based on the classification and eligibility
to P4P bonus pay-outs. Health workers are becoming
more conscious of the staff categories RCH and non-
RCH (and non-medical staff ) than before the introduc-
tion of P4P. This new emerging consciousness and iden-
tities at health facilities create barriers for teamwork,
which health care work relies on.
In our study, non-RCH staff mainly in hospitals is be-
coming reluctant to help the RCH department, the rea-
son being that the RCH are the major beneficiaries of
P4P bonuses. This, it can be argued, has serious implica-
tions to the overall quality of services offered to patients.
The need for teamwork in health services in resource
constrained settings, for example Tanzania, cannot be
overemphasised [44]. In our study a number of low-level
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staff reported to substantially help qualified staff, but
these workers are normally classified as non-medical
staff which has implications for their share of the P4P
bonus distribution. The reduced motivation and reduced
teamwork may have had an effect on the social relations
among health workers.
The use of incentives and sanctions can potentially
turn working relationships into a commercial contract
[33] and may have negative consequences for the work-
ing environment and the social relations at the work-
place. The collectively shared values that nurture
relations, creativity and ingenuity at work are outside
the realm of P4P. Establishing trust for instance is foun-
dational to health care, but such process indicators are
not measured in P4P and hence not eligible to bonus
pay-outs. With an incentive structure perceived as unfair
and that promotes outcomes and not processes, trust in-
stilled in patients through respectful interaction may be
undermined by time pressure and dwindling motivation.
Limitations
This study aimed to explore the perceptions and experi-
ences linked to P4P bonus distribution modality and
hence, did not address wider experiences and perception
with P4P. It was conducted in only one district out of
six in the Pwani Region implementing the P4P pilot.
The general characteristics and health status profile of
Rufiji district does not differ with the rest of the region,
except for the health facilities in the delta zone, which
were not included in our sample due to accessibility
challenges. Lastly, study informants and participants
were purposeful selected, and this implies that their
viewpoints may not be representative of other individ-
uals or settings.
Conclusion
Our results suggest that the experience of unfairness in
the way bonuses are distributed and administered on the
health facility level undermines the legitimacy of the P4P
scheme. Experiences and perceptions of health workers
and their ideals of fairness varies across socio-cultural
settings and yet important aspects to be considered dur-
ing the design stages of P4P initiatives. Success or failure
of such initiatives may depend to a significant degree on
how P4P designs can balance the need for results, while
maintaining and nurturing social relations in particular
settings. This is a valuable insight considering that many
P4P initiatives in many sub-Saharan African countries
are either at pilot stage or in the process of being
scaled-up.
Policy implication and recommendations
In this section we will identify some policy implications
and proffer a few policy recommendations based on our
findings. Fairness principles vary across contexts but in
this study it is demonstrated that effort has to be made
to understand contextual perceptions and meanings of
fairness. If this is not considered, a P4P scheme may lead
to perceived unfairness, which negatively affects social
relations among health workers and consequently ser-
vice delivery. Broadening the scope of stakeholders that
participate at the design stage of P4P programmes to in-
cluding frontline health workers could help in capturing
these contextual understandings of fairness and poten-
tially avoid misunderstandings in P4P bonus allocations.
Additionally, broadening the P4P indicators may also
help in tackling the fairness issue. When indicators are
wide enough, all health workers can contribute towards
P4P targets and this may reduce conflicts at health facil-
ities. In order to realize these recommendations, a
bottom-up approach which actively involves all stake-
holders including health workers and health service
users is needed when considering P4P reforms in low-
income context countries.
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